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How PSR hits Villa

The authoritative Swiss Ramble examines Aston Villa’s troubles with PSR.   Here is a summary of his main points.

Villa were the one Premier League club whose transfer window this summer was very clearly impacted by PSR, as noted by manager Unai Emery,  Villa actually had the lowest gross spend in the top flight this summer with just £42m, which was miles below the likes of Liverpool £459m, Chelsea £331m and Arsenal £291m.  For even more perspective, this was also a lot less than the three promoted clubs: Sunderland £193m, Burnley £135m and Leeds United £116m.

Villa’s financial challenges directly led to the sale of Jacob Ramsey to Newcastle United for £39m, which was a “pure profit” deal, as he is an Academy product.   However, it’s fair to say that Villa would have been willing to sell more players, e.g. both Emi Martinez and Ollie Watkins seemed destined to leave at various stages of the transfer window, though other clubs would have low-balled their bids, aware of Villa’s problems with PSR.

This meant that Villa only generated £48m from player sales, which was firmly in the bottom half of the Premier League, far below Chelsea £288m, Bournemouth £206m and Liverpool £191m.  over the last two years, Villa’s £72m net sales meant that they were the lowest spenders in the transfer market in the Premier League.  In stark contrast, four clubs had more than a quarter of a billion Pounds of net spend, namely Manchester United £322, Tottenham £310m, Arsenal £294m and Liverpool £250m.

Missing out on qualifying for the Champions League on the final day of last season (on goal difference) was critical for Villa’s spending plans this summer.  The difference in income with the Europa League means that Villa will see a significant reduction in their TV money, as well as likely losses in gate receipts and commercial deals.   Villa received £73m for reaching the Champions League quarter-finals in 2024/25, while England’s Europa League representatives earned less than half as much, around £40m less.

Villa’s issues with PSR have emerged despite substantial revenue growth. This has shot up by almost £100m (55%) in just two years from £178m to £276m in 2023/24, a huge new club record, while it will have broken through the £300m barrier last season after the Champions League exploits.

The owners have clearly aimed to transform Villa into one of the top teams in the Premier League, regularly playing in Europe, investing a substantial amount of money into the club in an attempt to achieve this aim.   However, the problem is that this level of expenditure almost inevitably leads to problems with PSR, as it tends to catch up with aspirational clubs, who can ill afford to make a false step, whether that be poor recruitment or indeed failure to qualify for the Champions League (or both).

Villa’s revenue growth has taken them up to 18th highest in the world, which is an impressive feat. However, their wages were 10th highest in 2023/24, ahead of the likes of Borussia Dortmund, Atlético Madrid, Juventus, Inter and Milan.  The eight places difference in the two rankings was the worst in the Deloitte Money League by some distance.

On PSR Villa were £12m below the maximum allowable loss of £105m, so the player sales that they booked in June 2024 were critical in order to comply with PSR, which helps explain why the club extended its accounting period from 31st May to 30th June.

Villa were £12m below the maximum allowable loss of £105m, so the player sales that they booked in June 2024 were critical in order to comply with PSR, which helps explain why the club extended its accounting period from 31st May to 30th June.

UEFA’s football earnings rule is similar to the Premier League’s PSR calculation, but it is a fair bit stricter, as the allowable losses are much smaller, even though these have increased over the years.  By the Swiss Ramble’s reckoning, Villa missed the 2024 target for UEFA’s football earnings rule by a country mile.  Their adjusted PSR loss for the 2-year monitoring period was a hefty £194m, using figures provided by the club itself for allowable deductions, as well as an estimate for the fair value adjustment.

Therefore, it was no great surprise when UEFA announced in July that Villa had “failed to fulfil the football earnings rule as a result of having an aggregate football earnings deficit above acceptable deviation.”   UEFA also found that Aston Villa breached the squad cost rule in 2024, having reported a squad cost ratio above 80%.

Villa were fined a total of €26m by UEFA for breaching financial regulations, split between €20m for the football earnings rule and €6m for the squad cost control rule.  Only €11m of Villa’s fine was unconditional with the remaining €15m depending on whether Villa meet future financial targets imposed by UEFA as part of a 3-year settlement agreement (€5m if Villa exceeds the 2025 target, €5m for the 2026 target and €5m for the final target).   Villa have agreed a 3-year settlement agreement with UEFA, covering the three reporting periods 2024/25, 2025/26 and 2026/27.

Villa continue to face a tricky balancing act in trying to comply with financial regulations, while at the same time not weakening the squad.  PSR has clearly restricted Villa’s attempts at reaching the next level, as the regulations benefit clubs with larger revenue (“survival of the fattest”, if you will).

It must be particularly galling that clubs carrying a huge amount of debt, e.g. Manchester United, can freely spend, while Villa are restricted, despite owing very little to third parties. The ambition of Sawiris and Edens has been backed by significant capital injections, as opposed to taking on debt, but that cuts little ice in the PSR/FFP world.

However, Villa’s trials and tribulations do highlight the difficulties facing aspirational clubs.   Let’s leave the last word to Unai Emery, “Financial control rules came to football to avoid bankruptcies and payment defaults with a good purpose. But as professionals we should review it, as this good tool will become a limitation for clubs that are doing good management, who’ll never be allowed to dream and get higher goals because the revenue, key for these financial rules, needs time to come to reality after sporting success.”

Much more information can be found on the Swiss Ramble’s Substack page

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