QPR face big challenges despite owner backing

West London is well served by top football clubs: Chelsea, Fulham, Brentford and Queens Park Rangers who would like to regain their place in the top flight.   Fulham have the most expensive tickets in the Premier League and have been trying to move up market.

Looking in from the outside, QPR’s results are particularly erratic.  A good away win is often followed by a home defeat.

The following comments are based on the usual forensic analysis by the Zurich-based football finance guru Swiss Ramble and much more detail and analysis is available on his Substack page.

QPR have long wanted to relocate from Loftus Road but have failed to do so.   Viable options simply aren’t there.  Meanwhile, they have their share of minor celebrities: Giles Coren and Lord Young of Acton (who did wonder if he should call himself Lord Young of Loftus Road).   He is actually mentioned in the Epstein files.*

Having spent three out of the four seasons between 2011/12 and 2014/15 in the Premier League, QPR are now in their 11th season in a row in the Championship.  They have spent most of this period in the bottom half of the table with their best finish being ninth in 2020/21, while the last three seasons have all involved (ultimately successful) battles against relegation.

The authortative Swiss Ramble reports QPR’s pre-tax loss widened from £13.5m to £20.3m in 2024/25, despite revenue rising £2.1m (8%) from £25.9m to £28.0m and profit on player sales slightly increasing from £2.2m to £2.3m.   This was more than offset by a steep increase in operating expenses, which rose £7.7m (19%) from £41.1m to £48.8m, while net interest payable almost tripled from £0.6m to £1.5m.

The revenue growth was very largely driven by the new EFL TV rights deal, which led to broadcasting increasing £2.5m (27%) from £9.3m to £11.8m, as there were small reductions in the other two revenue streams.   Gate receipts fell £0.1m (2%) from £6.9m to £6.8m, while commercial was down £0.3m (2%) from £9.7m to £9.4m.  QPR £20.1m pre-tax loss is the second largest reported so far, only “beaten” by Norwich City’s £20.7m.

The Super Hoopsare no strangers to losing money with the total loss in the last ten years adding up to a hefty £164m, though the size of the deficit has significantly reduced from past excesses, which led to massive losses of £65m in 2012/13, £46m in 2014/15 and £38m in 2017/18.

Relegation from the Premier League in 2014/15 is the root cause of QPR’s steep revenue decline, as this has dropped by two-thirds from £86m. Equally importantly, the club has missed out on the huge growth in TV rights in this time.  That said, last season is the club’s highest ever Championship revenue without the benefit of parachutes.

Despite last season’s growth, QPR’s £28.0m revenue is now in the bottom half of the Championship, miles below the clubs in receipt of parachute payments. Their revenue was at least three times as much, as seen in 2023/24 with Leeds United £128m, Leicester City £105m and Southampton £85m.

They were also a long way below some of the highest earning clubs without parachute payments, e.g. Bristol City £40m, Norwich City £39m, Sunderland £38m and Ipswich Town £37m.

QPR’s average attendance fell 5% in 2024/25 from 16,718 to 15,826, though it has still grown by a couple of thousand in the last five years. On the other hand, crowds are down by around 2,000 from the 17,809 peak in the top flight.  Following last season’s decrease, QPR’s 15,826 average attendance was one of the smallest in the Championship, only above Swansea City, Millwall, Luton Town and Oxford United. This was a long way below Sunderland 39,452, Leeds United 36,134, Derby County 29,018 and Sheffield United 28,087.

Wages

After a couple of years when they applied cuts, QPR invested in the squad last season, leading to an increase in the wage bill of £3.7m (15%) from £23.8m to £27.5m.   Given that there was no change in headcount, the implication is that the average wage has risen, which is not overly surprising of you look at some of the players acquired.

This is a far cry from Rangers’ free spending days in the past, e.g. QPR’s £75m wage bill back in 2013/14 is still the eighth highest ever in the Championship more than a decade later.

Even after last season’s increase, QPR’s £27m wage bill is still in the bottom half of the Championship, less than a third of the amounts paid by clubs benefiting from parachute payments, e.g. Leicester City £107m, Leeds United £84m and Southampton £81m.

QPR pushed the boat out (relatively speaking) in the transfer market in 2024/25, spending £10.0m on player purchases. The £7.5m net spend was their highest for ten years.  The £10.0m in one season was a lot, given that their gross spend in the last eight years combined only added up to £14.1m, partly because they had to tread carefully with PSR, especially after a transfer embargo in 2019.

Debt and funding

QPR’s gross financial debt rose £5m from £104m to £109m, mainly £102m provided by the owners (£93m loan plus a £9m convertible bond issued to Ruben Gnanalingham’s wife).  QPR’s £109m gross debt is one of the highest in the Championship, only surpassed by Leicester City £226m, Stoke City £151m, Blackburn Rovers £148m and Cardiff City £117m.  In fact, QPR’s debt would have been even higher if their owners had not converted £270m of loans into equity in the last decade. The accounts noted that they converted another £3.7m into capital in October 2025.

Once again, QPR noted that the club is “dependent on the continued support of its main shareholders”, who have confirmed that they will provide the necessary funding until at least 31st May 2027.  The average annual funding from the owners was £22m over the last five years, including £19m in 2024/25, which was more than twice as much as the £10m they averaged in the preceding 4-year period.  That said, the requirement has been even higher in the past, e.g. shareholders had to sign a cheque for a massive £46m each season between 2012/13 and 2015/16.

Whatever criticism is aimed at QPR’s owners (and they have clearly made several mistakes over the years), nobody can accuse them of not putting their hands into their pockets.  Following the latest round of financing, Ruben Gnanalingam remains the majority shareholder with just under 79%, while the Mittal family (represented on the board by Amit Bhatia) has 11% with American businessman Richard Reilly’s share 10%.

 

The auditors (and indeed Lee Hoos) mentioned a material uncertainty in the accounts, as the club’s ability to continue as a going concern is dependent on the owner funding. This is not guaranteed, despite the presence of deeds of support signed by the shareholders.

Such a comment is clearly not ideal, as it’s relatively rare for an auditor to sound such a note of caution. However, it’s worth noting that quite a few other clubs in the Championship currently include a similar “material uncertainty” comment, so fans should not be overly alarmed.

QPR have fallen foul of PSR in the past, but the Swiss Ramble thinks that they complied with the target in 2024/25 relatively comfortably.

The Swiss Ramble concludes that ‘It’s difficult to argue with the club’s short-term objective, which is “to be competitive in the Championship and target a play-off place. The board’s primary aim is also to implement the strategic plans to ensure that the club is self-sustainable in the near future.”

The fact is that Rangers pretty much have to spend beyond their means if they want to compete with the “parachute payment” clubs that have much larger budgets, but this inevitably means that they end up losing money,  One activity that they absolutely have to improve if they genuinely aspire to be sustainable is player trading, which has been a bit of a disaster area in the past few years. Investment in the Academy should help, but this will take a while to feed through into the numbers.’

*Lord Young has vigorously defended allegations brought against him in his Spectator column in which he also covers QPR from time.   He also has a blog with match reports, although his eldest son may write some of these.  To summarise what Lord Young has said, he had tenuous contacts with G Maxwell and she then inadvertently inserted him in Epstein’s contacts book.   Lord Young has emphatically denied that he ever met Epstein or travelled on the aeroplane sometimes referred to as the Lolita Express or that he has ever visited what he has termed ‘Paedo Island’.

It is evident that he was very much a fringe player in all of this.  What is more puzzling is his feud with former Charlton fanzine editor Rick Everitt which led Lord Young to travel to Margate in the hope of confronting Everitt at the beach at 10.30 on a Tuesday morning.   Everitt has made no comment, but possibly thought that two men in their early sixties confronting each other on a windswept beach was not an edifying spectacle.