What has happened to Chelsea's brave new world?

The dismissal of ‘Linkedin Liam’ solves one problem at Chelsea, but one has to ask why he was appointed in the first place.  Most Chelsea fans would acknowledge there are far deeper problems under the current ownership.

Do the owners really understand what is involved, particularly emotionally, in running a top football club?  As was remarked on Radio 5 this morning, it’s hardly the same as turning round a ball bearings company in Wisconsin.   Nevertheless, the owners clearly think they will eventually be able to cash in on their investment.

So let’s step back and see what the Swiss Ramble has to make of their 2024/25 accounts from his Zurich fastness.

Chelsea’s strategy has been far more reliant on player sales than any other major English club, so they have generated an impressive £859m from this activity in the last decade. In this period, they made more than £100m on four occasions.

They made £273m in the three seasons since BlueCo got involved, which was the third highest in the Premier League, only surpassed by Manchester City £356m and Brighton £289m.   That’s pretty good, but there has been a bit of a decline under Clearlake, as the Blues made £293m in the preceding 3-year period, even though that was adversely impacted by COVID, which deflated the transfer market.

The business model is clear

Looking at the last three years, Chelsea’s business model is clear. They made a £689m operating loss, exacerbated by £30m net interest payable, which they partially offset with £273m profit from player sales, giving an underlying loss of £446m.

However, this was nowhere near enough in a PSR world, so they made £272m from assets sales to other group companies, though they also booked £50m exceptional charges for legal/FFP fines, thus restricting the reported loss to “only”£224m.

Revenue disappointments

Chelsea noted that their £491m revenue was the “second highest level on record”, which is one way of saying that it has dropped £21m in the last two years.  Indeed, it has only grown by £10m (2%) in the three years under BlueCo, largely due to only playing in the Conference League, instead of the far more lucrative Champions League, which has led to a £32m (14%) decrease in broadcasting.

In fact, Chelsea’s £10m (2%) revenue growth in those three years is by far the worst of the Big Six, with the next smallest increase being £81m (13%) at Manchester City.  In contrast, their main rivals have managed to increase revenue by a lot more, especially Arsenal £321m, Tottenham £122m and Liverpool £108m.

Chelsea’s £491m revenue is now only the sixth highest in the Premier League, a fair way behind the top five, especially the three leading clubs, who are all around £700m, namely Liverpool £703m, Manchester City £694m and Arsenal £690m.

European money

The importance of European TV money to Chelsea’s revenue is evident, as they averaged just under €100m in the four seasons up to 2022/23, including the club record €120m in 2020/21 when they beat Manchester City to win the Champions League. Therefore, the drop-off in the last two seasons, including a failure to qualify for Europe at all in 2023/24, has hit them hard.

In the three seasons in the Clearlake era, Chelsea have earned €118m from Europe, compared to €290m in the last three years of the Roman empire. The consequent €173m fall in income was the worst performance of the leading English clubs.

It had been hoped that Chelsea’s new owners would bring more expertise to the commercial operations, but there has been little sign of an American transformation to date.

Stadium

The relatively low match day income explains why the club is considering a new stadium.  [I remember these discussions back in the 1990s when the Battersea power station site was considered.] Plans had been well advanced under Abramovich before the project was put on hold after his political difficulties started.  However, any stadium development at Stamford Bridge would be extremely challenging, because of its location, close to a railway line, the Tube, a cemetery and an underground river.

The cost has been estimated as between £1.5 bln and £2 bln, though this could be covered by the infrastructure expenditure that the new owners committed when they acquired the club.  These difficulties have led to the club exploring opportunities elsewhere, including nearby Earls Court {discussed in the 1990s], though that would also prove difficult, given the council’s approval of other plans involving residential and office development.

Chelsea’s wage bill rose £21m (6%) from £338m to £359m, partly due to higher performance-related bonuses for winning the Conference League, though any reward for winning the FIFA Club World Cup will likely only be booked this season, given that the final was only played on 13 July 2025.

Chelsea spent £305m on player purchases in 2024/25, which was the third highest in the Premier League, only behind Manchester City £353m and Manchester United £343m.   Chelsea’s £745m outlay in BlueCo’s first season in 2022/23 is by some distance the highest ever in England, while the £553m the following season is the second highest. Even after the reduction last season, their £305m gross spend is sixth highest.

Brave new world has yet to deliver

In the three years since the Clearlake takeover, the owners have put in £1.1 bln, split between £654m capital and £471m loans. The club also made £594m from player sales, giving £1.7 bln available cash.  The vast majority was invested in the squad with £1.5 bln player purchases, while £195m was used to cover operating losses.

The Swiss Ramble notes: “Chelsea’s brave new world has yet to deliver financially, only setting the wrong sort of records with England’s highest ever loss, unprecedented levels of transfer spending and agent fees.

The full horror of BlueCo’s losses can be seen at the holding company level, which also highlights the massive loans they have taken out to fund the “project”, as well as the substantial capital injections they have had to make.”

The Chelsea Supporters’ Trust is also far from convinced, “This has been presented as part of a long-term plan. Yet four years on, there is still no sufficiently clear or convincing explanation of how that plan delivers sustained success while preserving a recognisable Chelsea identity.”